The presence of English in India at the crossroads chapter 1
THE PRESENCE OF ENGLISH IN INDIA AT THE
CROSSROADS
Probal Dasgupta
Kumud Chandra Dutta Memorial Lectures 1997
(Dibrugarh University, Assam)
Published as ‘The presence of English in India
at the crossroads’, pp 1-132, in Probal Dasgupta, Udayon Misra, Amaresh Datta
(2002) English at Crossroads: The Post-Colonial Situation: Kumud Chandra
Dutta Memorial Lecture Series, 1997-98. Guwahati: Students’ Stores.
Posted here chapterwise; this is the first of
six chapters. In the text itself I call the chapters ‘sections’ and the
sections ‘subsections’.
1. From National English to Cognitive Welfare
1.1 Preamble
In the argument I present
here, I address a question of knowledge. Many people in India know English.
What do they know in and as English?
The argument I propose to
construct addresses this issue at a conceptual level at which one is asking
more generally what anybody knowing any language can be said to know. The
question takes a significant form for English in India for a variety of
reasons. One is that the use of this language here is at a crossroads and this
conjuncture raises issues that might otherwise lie dormant. Another reason has
to do with the open and visible mediations whereby English is supported and
surrounded by interventions and knowledge systems in other languages that make
its continued presence in this country both appropriate and, paradoxically by
the same token, something of an embarrassment.
As a consequence, much of
the argument offered here is a matter of methodology. I propose that knowing a
language means knowing that certain types of conversations have taken place,
that certain things have been said in more or less memorable forms and
contexts. Hence the irreducibility of a literary component in one's knowledge
of language. Neither linguistic nor literary study has been able to find ways
to cope with this elementary fact, certainly not in university departments of
English or linguistics; obviously the public needs to cope with it first to
make an academic second coping possible. I propose further that knowing a
language means knowing that one can creatively continue these conversations in
extended contexts, and that these continuabilities are themselves embroiled in
other knowledges, for all knowing is a matter of action continuability.
This methodological
enterprise becomes paradigmatic in that the argument presented here shows,
though it has no occasion to turn this into an explicit saying in the sense of
the old opposition between saying and showing, the following point: The types
of reality which language ‑‑ and languages exist in and as knowledges ‑‑
provides examples of need to be viewed not only retrospectively, but also
prospectively or potentially. Retrospective terms are often seen as physical;
and prospective or potential terms are frequently viewed as "conceptual‑mental"
terms if we stick to the body‑mind stand‑off, or as "perceptual‑cognitive"
terms if we can move towards a richer view of the materiality of mental action.
I suggest further that
the wider class of actions involved need to be perceptually and conceptually
unhooked from what I characterize as a monumentalist paradigm, which I shall
often call the Olympian approach. This focus on performance alone, worshipping
as it does the human ability to create huge or tall or otherwise record‑breaking
structures, is able to detect
achievement only in concentric circles coming out of the Olympic games or other
prize giving and record keeping activities. These methodological issues appear,
for us, in the context of a particular phenomenon: the use of English in our
country.
Many of us view the
issues raised by the presence of English in India as a matter of language form
or function. A formal approach asks how much and how this English mixes with
the other languages of the land. A functional approach might ask what various
people use their various vocabularies for, how happy they seem to be with all
this, and what one proposes to do about the patterns of unhappiness. One
strategy of functional inquiry is to juxtapose English with Hindi, supposedly a
rival language, and raise questions of power and feasibility. Another is to
distribute this issue into the states, conflating the notions of state
language and Regional Language, and to ask, again, questions of power and
feasibility.
An obvious second option
is to explore certain intersections between these familiar debates and
relatively new questions of decolonization, economic or cultural. This
territory remains uncharted. But its agendas are overdetermined by cognate work
that does exist in cultural studies. It is a priori clear what compulsions will
drive one to the study of the form and function of languages as ideologies,
with English as an imperial ideology cast as an unsurprising special case.
I agree with those who
root for that second option that the use of English is India is primarily
instrumental. And surely ideological studies are one way to get a grip on this
or other instrumental uses of cultural resources. But this method of inquiry
looks at the matter purely externally. It leaves obscure and undeveloped our
understanding of the content of a language as part of a mental landscape. To
develop our perceptions, it seems to me, we need to push the debates on English
and other languages in India in a cognitive direction, which has been severely neglected by theoreticians,
linguistic or otherwise.
The question for those of
us who wish to develop this third option is: what is the form and function of
the content of a language? How does one study it? How do we go about connecting
this inquiry to more familiar topics and methods? What does English in India
mean that, say, Marathi in India does not? This internal question leads us to
look at the way people think in a language, not just what they think about it.
Thinking, or knowledge, is a resource embedded in a language, if you see it as
readily transferable from one vehicle to another. If you look at the whole
ecology differently, recognizing the difficulties of access across vehicles,
you prefer to see languages as cognitive resources within which knowledge‑ecological
mechanisms set up and sometimes sustain certain kinds of contexts.
Why
should this third option pit itself against the first? That part seems clear.
The first approach, studying as it does the form and function of languages in a
general linguistics, is trapped in a widely discredited liberal humanism. Why,
however, should one see this third approach as needing to be distinguished even
from the second approach that characterizes much avant‑garde thinking in the
humanities and the social sciences? This may need some clarification.
Sheila Rampersad (p.c.,
1997) points out that creative writing and its commentarial accompaniment in
the English‑speaking Caribbean responds vigorously to regional work in the
same language, but has had considerable trouble ‑‑ postcolonial radicalism
notwithstanding ‑‑ surmounting the language barrier and learning from or with
cognate minds in the Dutch, French, Spanish speakers of the region. I take this
as a prototypical example. If even people with as much vigour, creativity, a
desire for change, and mutual goodwill as the new writers in the Anglophone
Caribbean are hampered by language, it seems to me that one must assume
language provides the context for action and knowledge. Transmission and free
traffic are not a foregone conclusion. They have to be fought for and, as I
would like to emphasize, thought for. It is that thinking that I am identifying
as the less often tried third option. The fact that English provides access to
a world of knowledge has been the real basis for its continued power. Debaters
normally take this for granted and ask what one can do about the power
equations. I would like to ask in some detail how the terrains of knowledge set
up specific equations between languages, and whether one can do anything
about this traffic and its consequences.
In other words, the point
is not to simply continue various debates about English and its presence in
India, but to ask, at what is clearly a crucial juncture in this continued
presence, how the debates might be usefully redirected. If the cognitive forms
part of the social, then a spectrum of serious sociolinguistic inquiry should
include what one might call a cognitively based linguistics. By this I mean not
the assembly of considerations from psychology, philosophy, computer science,
and linguistics that is explored under the rubric of cognitive science.
Rather, I mean an ecologically accountable linguistics of the contexts of
language use that looks at certain factors that throw various contexts up ‑‑
and down ‑‑ taking the pragmatic and cognitive baggage carried by these
contexts into account.
My principal emphasis, in
these explorations, will be against the culture of measurement that has
dominated our age. It was a classical thought that the unexamined life was not
worth living. The modern period, in its usually unexamined classicality, has
turned this into the thought that the unmeasured life is unbearable because it
is unspecified as to worth. For worth too, this measured century asks you to
see, is always a measurement. It follows, on this reasoning, that before you
ask what anything is worth, you must first measure everyone and everything in
sight. As a metonymic symbol of this
ubiquitous measurement, I choose the Olympic Games. Accordingly, I will think
of English as the Olympian language which India puts to certain uses. A sociologist
of labour might have preferred to focus instead on the fact that this century
began with the time and motion studies of the actual work processes of
labourers that enabled the creation of assembly line procedures or Fordism,
gave rise to industrial psychology and management science, and greatly deepened
the control that the nation‑state, ever since the setting up of national
medical systems, exercises over the working life of individuals. I prefer to
choose a symbol that stresses the hold of these systems over people's playing
life as well. My decision to see English as an Olympian rather than an Olympic
language casts a side glance at the patrician attitude that the owners of
English as a knowledge resource share with the Greek gods on Mount Olympus. But
the main concern is with this Olympic specification of what counts, literally
Counts, as a conceivable system of knowledge and of knowledgeable or mature
action.
As will become somewhat
clearer at the end of this document than it can be now, my submission is that
truly mature patterns of action and knowledge need to evolve towards
sustainability, and it becomes clear, when one examines the Olympian ethos,
that the present order of knowledge, not being sustainable, is moving into a
transition that we need to understand if we are to guide ourselves through it.
Let us now touch base
with certain obvious empirical starting points.
Independent Indian
society has been operating on the basis of a division of cognitive labour on
the language front. We do the bulk of our literary, cultural, expressive
activities in the Indian languages. And English is in the driver's seat. It
drives industry, science, business, intellectuality: in short, the whole
apparatus of our nation‑state and its dealings with other communities and with
its own modernity.
We have distributed our
cognitive resources in this fashion for long enough that we now see the
patterns emerging. And we are not entirely sure we like what we see. So the
nation is in the throes of a slow reorganization. It is the responsibility of
thinking men and women to help this process along. Hence our task. What are we
going to do, in order to try and understand that the presence of English in our
country is at a crossroads, and to sort out the intellectual traffic jam we
have gotten into?
The problem is not the
real but harmless spillover of English into our creative activities and
languages. On the contrary, I shall argue that we need to welcome and
streamline this spillover. What we face is, above all, a question of cultural,
cognitive, linguistic health as a factor in human welfare, not an issue of
anybody's inherited wealth seen as a pure commodity. What does harm the health
of our languages is not the supposed impure admixture with foreign words, but
the stultifying confinement of our languages to the expressive and cultural
sector of this nation's knowledge system. This confinement stunts the growth of
our mental core, and makes our relaxed discussions stupid. That we as
individuals continue to have active access to a sophisticated intelligence that
operates in English does not help. Our personal and social relation with that
intelligence becomes unsustainable. For we restrict it to a language in which
we don't conduct our relaxed private discussions. And the way out is not to
move our entire life into English and become simply an Anglophone nation,
obviously, but to expand the scope of our own languages as carriers of all the
knowledge we have acquired.
Right now, only the
educational and journalistic dishing‑out of what we know is conducted in the
Indian languages. We produce and sustain our knowledge system in English alone.
As a result, our discussions in our own languages are seriously curtailed in
scope and depth. This unstable state of affairs is going to force us to move
towards a set‑up where we possess, even if we do not consistently use, the same
capabilities in our own languages and in English.
The practical question
is, who is going to bell the cat? After we address this issue, we shall place
our proposals in a theoretical context that may be of some independent use.
1.2 Reflections on a Negotiated Rationality
People used to rule by
wielding legitimate terror, as in warfare and other activities where games must
end in victories and defeats. It is now normal to regard negotiation as a more
legitimate method of securing stable arrangements for international boundaries
and other disputed matters. I would like to propose that knowledge systems and
conceptions of rationality are also going to have to give up their tyrannical
and terrorist regimes in favour of negotiation with the informal regional
knowledges that any formal knowledge system must do business with. English is
one site of this struggle between the waning legitimacy of terror and the
waxing legitimacy of negotiation.
As part of our
reflections on the best way to improve the style of this negotiation, we may
usefully focus on the conversations between the literate and the illiterate.
There is a reason for the choice of this topic.
General illiteracy has
been described as a reliable guarantor of the continued existence of less
powerful languages. A low literacy population that speaks many languages is
compelled to run its national equation between elite and subalterns on parallel
tracks, as linguistically differentiated regional equations. Elites have to
speak to subalterns in the several languages in which the informal speaking
continues to take place. And, elites being what they are, this process spawns
literatures in regional languages as a byproduct of these necessary
conversational systems. The systems do not gear their existence to the satisfaction
of literary desires, however. They exist to ensure the give and take of the
necessary "instruction/s", in both directions and in all senses of
this slippery term. The question is how this continuous negotiation between
elite and subaltern in societies like India can evolve, now that literacy is
growing, without destroying the cultural health of a multilingual population,
precariously perched on ad hoc branches of a poorly understood tree of
knowledge whose fruit we upanishadically refrain from eating.
Clearly we need to find a
way that knowledge resources, plenished and replenished in a sustainable cycle,
become the basis for a less obscurely managed preservation of our communities,
defined languagewise or otherwise. If we do not make friends with our knowledge
resources, they turn poisonous and pollutive instead of serving as resources.
In other words, I propose to shift the debates about language on to the terrain
of the discussion of knowledges, seen in the plural.
If warfare is no longer acceptable
as a real arbiter of disputes, a general demobilization into civilian life must
follow. Alas, we have yet to learn how to do this. For civilian life can only
function on its own if its citizens learn mutual civility. And this ingredient
has been lacking in all known civilizations so far. I would submit that one
cannot learn manners unless one is also simultaneously learning the matters
that matter, in other words, that the necessary civil style can only co‑evolve
with the cognitive content of civilization. In other words, we can replace the
mobilized methods that characterized warfare only if we develop sustainable
methods based on taking the cognitive content of our cultural resources
entirely seriously, at all levels of cognition and culture.
Any developing takes
time, of course. But one must ask whether the time one is spending is being
well spent. My reading is that we have sacrificed a lot of time on the altar of
the false god of excessive industrialization. English is a prime case in point.
English has been to language what overdevelopment has been to life in general:
an industrial hijack of the cognitive. And in both cases, the struggle to
regain the ascendancy of life over the forces that threaten it must take an
environmentalist form. In the case in point, we need to learn how to retrieve
the cognitive from the industrial hijack. This learning will happen as part of
the struggles within the domain of knowledge that will now increasingly replace
the disputes that used to erupt in the old‑fashioned military form, seeking
permanent victories over enemies that would accept permanent defeats and go
under. And one knows in advance that cognitive debates never get
"settled" in quite that fashion, as they can never seriously seek
such an end.
All this sounds rather
utopian, needless to say. The present industrial organization of our knowledge
resources easily outshouts any voices that might plead for a rational revision
of rationality canons to maximize cognitive negotiation and minimize tyranny.
Why then should we not realistically envisage a scenario where grievances
against this and other tyrannies remain toothless and shrill?
I shall take the position
that agendas that target a particular kind of tyrannical imposition of
asymmetry acquire teeth and seem generally relevant only when the general
perception of compulsions ‑‑ of what is a public necessity and what a private
option ‑‑ makes that particular anti‑tyrannical cause seem more real and less
remote. Such a process of the generalization of the relevant grievance brings
that utopia down to the earth of a practical debate about who gets to do what
and where the energies are going to come from.
In our postmodern period,
characterized as it is by regional and new‑regional movements, there is at last
a general agreement that one is going to dismantle centralizations and devolve
power to both the old, geographical regions and the constituencies that I find
it convenient to call the New Regions of a nation: categories such as Women,
or Dalits, or Aboriginals, or Refugees, or Inhabitants of Less Developed Rural
Districts, or even, under certain transitional conditions, Students.
These social movements
exist. I take it that this is a mandate for those of us who wish to root for
the old and new regions they speak for. Both in the politics of new parties
reflecting these aspirations, and in the civil social processes of NGOs serving
or exploiting some of these categories, many of us are busy articulating the
self‑interest perceptions and evolving negotiating styles of regions and new
regions. I take this for granted. The question I am trying to bring into focus
is: How can we do all this with some theoretical comprehension of what all this
means and where it might take us? To put it more usefully: Okay, we are
rooting for regions old and new. What do we root for them as? As victims of a
traditional injustice to be set right by activist judges and their various non‑wig‑wearing
equivalents?
I shall hazard the guess
that we need to redefine terms of knowledge the way victims of the global
economic order want terms of trade redefined. And here there is an intentional
pun on the term Terms. You redefine terms of knowledge by working on how
technical terms live and move and have their being.
Technical terms exist at
one level in an umbrella language like English where official technicality
finds a home. At another level, technical terms are mediated through regional
languages spoken by the population that needs to operate with the terms.
Technical terms embody a certain trading equation between an industrial English
and an operational regionality. The regional language ‑‑ and I mean this with
some consciousness of the diversity of regions, and thus the heterogeneity of
what will count as regional codes and discourses ‑‑ may be given some token or
real responsibility of harbouring its own technical terms. These will then be
subject to translational control from English. Or the regional language is
supposed to merely explain the English to the silent majority. On any
arrangement, the regional discourse must mediate between the technical terms of
an English and the operative population actually living in the regions. And you
have to work on this regional discursive mediation whenever the regime of
technical terms is modified in any way. Which it continuously is.
The issue, then, becomes:
How does one root for regions as one watches and takes part in the terminology‑renegotiating
process that continuously redefines the terms of trade between an industrial English
and the culturally deforested regions?
My tentative answer is
that you root for regions by visualizing them as interlocking sets of milieux
where real life is spelled out as serial action networks that nurture. This
formula might use some unpacking. A serial action is an activity that involves
a series of acts with some repetition. Typically, serial actions pass from
earlier actors, some of them masters, to later actors, some of them
apprentices. And some of this passing is handled by an actual relation,
typically in the apprenticeship model, though other dyads such as parent‑child
are not always most usefully seen as apprenticeships. A serial action network
is a network of such relations, call them overlapping apprenticeship groups in
the absence of a more representative or accurate way of visualizing the whole
business of the cultural self‑renewal that is normal in such groups. To unpack
the last term in the formula, nurturing is the way that cultural self‑renewal
of this sort looks when the impositions always present in any intersubjective
labour do not take the driver's seat and formally define the whole network in
terms of power or codification.
I must continue my
tentative answer by noting that mutuality of relational definition holds not
only within a region, but across regions under an umbrella (national or
otherwise). In other words, we conceive of regions as a way to think about
mutualizing or relationalizing the negotiation process. That way, negotiation
is no longer seen as a fragmentary, ad hoc preamble to real settlements, the
way it used to be. Instead, we take the view that negotiation is the real
thing. The final settlements are going to be permanent negotiations, always on‑going,
and from that point of view one will retrospectively see earlier versions of
negotiation as the best that a prehistoric, war‑mongering period could do to
approximate to the art of negotiating of our period seen as the beginning of a
serious and lasting cultivation of peace as the supreme arbiter of disputes.
Notice that I did not
say: of differences. Peace is the art of preserving differences and yet
preventing the disputes that differences may give rise to from leading to
warfare. And it is important to notice at the outset that such management of
differences cannot be based on telling everybody that all players in the game
are equal. They aren't, and this is going to count as part of the game. The
point is not to deny this reality, but to face it without evasion and without
manipulation of perceptions.
In the context of English
in India vis‑‑vis regional languages,
this means that if you take the point of view of warlike struggle then it is
going to look as though one is accepting permanent second class status for
these regional languages under a paramount English. Is this undesirable? Only
if and when users of regional languages find this form of survival
unacceptable.
I shall take the position
that, at our conjuncture, regional languages in India exist as side shows to a
principal spectacle constituted in English. They are side shows as far as their
spectacle value is concerned. This appears to be a defeat. But scrutinize this
appearance. And you find that it is in the regional languages that the
communities quietly, and almost unobservably, negotiate the decision to stage
a spectacular show in English, and other important overall decisions. This
looks like a long‑term fact, doesn't it? It is the conversations in the regional
languages which continue to call the shots, on this reading, don't they?
Some of us will see this
as a sour grapes reading. But watch the impulse that makes us see things this
way. We root for regional languages in the mode of wanting them to come out
Victorious. And we feel sorry for them if they look secondary under a
paramount Master English. Now, that is a problem only for the game of winners
and losers which envisages a single victor. English does work in the context of
that game. But that game is the spectacle itself. If we are capable of seeing
the way the spectacular show is set up, that puts us in a position where we
will stop wanting victories, and start asking what is sustainable and where the
sustainability is built and rebuilt by negotiation. Which sends us to the
regional languages as the sites of such negotiation ‑‑ now recast, remember, as
the real thing, not as a preliminary that paves the way for our future
victories.
The scenario that we see
emerging, which though encouraging does need some doses of comprehension and
insightful action, goes as follows. The Indian network of regional communities
does keep English as the spectacular, principal knowledge clearing house. Our
regional literate elites may even choose to shed the usual lexical purism and ‑‑
following a useful tradition initiated in Kerala by Joseph Mundasseri in the
fifties ‑‑ give specific legitimacy to certain types of English loans in the
careful or rigorous forms of Indian languages. For surely we need not invent
indigenous‑sounding technical terms every time the metropolitan terminological
system sways to the dance of fashion. It makes better sense for us to simply
take that hype as ephemeral advertising, thus leaving pieces of English jargon
untranslated and unassimilated in our languages. This self‑restraint would
leave our term creation energies free for the more important work of conceptual
accommodation and reinterrogation.
In other words, shedding
some of our purism would help us to preserve our languages as effective tools
for the regional bases they build for us. English is not our existential base.
English is something we do, a virtuoso performance.
One might accuse this
analysis of denying agency to Anglophone Indians who do all their work in
English. It is true that those of us who work at the interface of the
expressive and the industrial in the national knowledge network are making
decisions in English. It is true also that these decisions take part in shaping
the configuration of knowledge networks. So our analysis must pursue the issues
into the Anglophone minority of India's population. There we find the
possibility of a certain climbdown, a chutnification of English as knowledge
that might meet the regional languages half‑way. To employ a metaphor that
cancels the deforestation that the industrial knowledge system working in
English has been guilty of, we might argue that English‑carried knowledge
today seems to feel compelled to go in for a full‑scale detechnologization or
greening, passing on the intellectual leadership of the knowledge enterprise
from the scientizing to the humanizing sector of the system. This takes a
complex form, on my reading. The narrative wing of this sector employs tools
from a basket that I shall call Metafiction to cover a vast range of techniques
including magic realism, metafiction proper, and related material. The
conceptual wing of the knowledge sector has begun to use a repertory that
emphasizes the need to augment perception rather than concepts, and which includes
critical and postmodernist theoretical devices in the service of rethinking the
representations.
Representations of what?
Of the constituencies in the population as it has been reconfiguring itself.
If this takes a regional form, it thus becomes inevitable that this country's
serious practitioners of English‑driven knowledge will be driven past the usual
hang‑ups, to the point of having to relearn the regional languages themselves.
In saying this, I am merely repeating A.K. Ramanujan's prediction (personal
communication, 1992) that the Anglophone thinkers of India are going to find it
necessary, by the logic of their own impulses, to relearn regional languages.
The point is not only about language, but about knowledge: India's Anglophones
are going to find it necessary to learn from the regions to meet half‑way the
forces of the regions learning from them.
Such learning becomes
possible as the equations that set knowledge up as knowledge modify themselves,
recasting the regional discourses as legitimate and self‑conscious cognition
networks that our Anglophones, addicted as they are to recognizable
formalities, will be able to construe as knowledge, and therefore to learn. In
the postmodern period, the struggle over language is an ecological struggle
over what counts as knowledge. All ecologies are shaped by negotiations: the
niches are not fixed a priori, but sites of co‑evolution. Negotiations involve
cooperation, but they have competitive goals too; subcommunities in any
ecosystem struggle for advantage, and sometimes some of them also strive to
attain a system‑steering position if that seems advantageous.
The subcommunities in an
ecosystem combine cooperation and competition in this way even in the organic
world. And human ecology, involving the cultural process of representing our
modes of participation and handling these representations in terms of affective
stances built around cognitive cores, is that much more complex while retaining
the fundamental properties of any ecosystem. As humans get used to this, we
begin the hard, uphill trek to sustainable ways of cooperating. It took us
thousands of years to evolve the various methods of competing: tribal battles,
national wars, commercial throat‑cutting, subtler forms mediated through banks
and stock markets and insurance, and cultural politics. We are now self‑consciously
beginning to develop for cooperation the full range of methods that we have
already developed for competition, now that the competition‑maximizing period
of history seems to have been played out.
To bring the argument to
a head: we are able to see the need to not only negotiate, but even discuss the
nature and course of the negotiations intelligently to help these processes
along. Questions now arise about conceptual tools that are going to be helpful
for those of us who are trying to go in for such a discussion. Hence the next
section.
1.3 Tools for the big negotiation
The work that English has
done in India that has shown serious continuity is that of focusing our
analytical and translative abilities on the task of negotiating between
indigenous narrative spaces, as reconstituted during the mediaeval mutation,
and the vectors of modernity. This negotiative work has been primarily
conceptual‑cognitive and secondarily perceptual‑expressive, for reasons we need
to explore more carefully for real and not just academic understanding. Such
exploration must not ignore the real perceptual and expressive powers of the
Indo‑English literati, of course. These authors present and represent the
predicament of the generation we shall call Translation's Children. These children
are compelled by their closeness to the urban squalor of the unsatisfactory
negotiation so far between our lives and modernity to find new ways to tell
their stories. Translation's Children are the people who have to, and therefore
will, bell the cat.
But no writing, including
Indian English literature, has been able to speak for the heterogeneity of the
interests and cultural self‑interest perceptions of Translation's Children.
What about the nativist opposition to the hegemony of English that expresses
itself aggressively in the Indian languages? It tends to get trapped in the
role of a 'romantic other produced by the industrial apparatus', to use a
felicitous characterization due to Susie Tharu (seminar intervention, 1990) ‑‑
but it also does slide into the really distinct part of the continuum of self‑expression.
Will a comparative literature or a history help an English studies discipline
to rescue us from the disarray of this composite space?
The disciplines as
currently constituted know how to deal with these praxes as opacities, not as
self‑rule‑giving praxes in a state of mutually transparency‑seeking exchange ‑‑
not as respectful freedoms, that is. They lack a common currency and can at
best work towards a cognitive habeas corpus. One needs a Universal Lexical
Mediation notation so that the perceptual can meet the conceptual, the regional
practice can meet the interpractical theory, in the renewed negotiations. This
mediator can work only if it serves as a currency of theoretical coinage as
well as practical visibility. The Anglophone discursive systems on which Indian
academic efforts normally rely have developed no such Universal Lexical
Mediation notation on their own. But the planned international auxiliary
language Esperanto is available as a metaphor for the work such a notation will
have to do when one becomes generally accepted. It will useful for us if we get
into the habit of reading each medium as an esperanto.
Why cannot the
disciplines of English studies and historiography in their existing forms
simply take on the job of belling our cat? Why should we not expect them to
provide analyses, if they have not already done so, to satisfy our specific
needs as well? It is not a matter of the laziness or nonperformance of particular
practitioners, but a problem about the way these disciplines are constituted.
English studies and historiography as they stand are designed for the study of
perceptually scrutinizable codes, which the public can perceive as codified
and can try and inspect as to whether they are valid representations. These
disciplines cannot directly deal with conceptually accountable discourses. Nor
can they help us install or enforce standards of such accountability. These
disciplines use concepts as a common currency for the purposes of public
perceptual scrutiny. They are not in the business of fashioning concepts as
part of their own work. If we force them to get into that business, we are
asking them to be something that they are not. The results of such an exercise
are unlikely to serve anybody's purposes!
It is in this context
that we have to begin to see, and act on the realization, that linguistics can
help us all, together, to do an important job that few other disciplines are
currently willing or able to take on. Namely, linguistics can provide a
negotiating space and appropriate tools for the forces representing the
industrial fortification and expansion of English and the forces working for
the cognitive enrichment and strengthening of India's regional languages to
theoretically encounter each other. Such an encounter will help us to make
sense of the practical stalemates that mark the presence of English in India.
And produce a new reading of what the regions are and how they reconstitute
themselves, the notions of autonomy, and the possibilities of choice in the
newer integrations taking shape in today's coalitions.
This task is urgent
because there is a sense in which this presence is now at a certain cross‑roads.
To see this, we shall go over some points of departure, and then try to really
depart from them.
The presence of English
on the Indian scene, we often assume, mainly serves the network of articulate
national knowledge. On such a portrayal, the service it renders leaves regional
and local populations unharmed. One supposes that this service leaves
unimpaired the capability of regional populations for self‑expression in their
own languages.
I would like to argue
here that this portrayal is seriously unhelpful and needs to be modified in
terms of a very different and spatialized, actionized notion of what counts as
an articulation of knowledge. On my way to this argument, let me make two
observations about contemporary Indian usage. First, we make a distinction, at
the level of unexamined custom, between what we call the Language Press, of the
Indian languages, and a so‑called National Press, which operates in English.
The second point of usage is that English literature departments in our
universities are often described as departments, not of English or of English
Literature, but simply of Literature.
These two points of
usage, like many other little signs that some of us must have noticed and that
would serve equally well as signs of the times, mark our decision to allow
English as a systematizing apparatus to occupy most of our mental space in a
way that leaves only an unprocessed cud of Indianness for the so‑called
Language Press to chew. For convenience of reference and examination, I shall
describe this occupation of India's knowledge and literature systems by
English as an industrial hijack of the cognitive.
Such a description is of
course fruitful only if we embed it in lines of thought that point to a
possible exit from this hijack. Otherwise it remains merely shrill.
Must such thinking take a
nativist form, as is commonly believed on both sides of many contemporary
debates? I don't see why it must. Continuing and extending certain themes
explored in my monograph on what I have called the otherness of English in
India, the present analysis directly and non‑nativistically pursues the
systematizing imperative that drives the presence of English in our period in
general and our India in particular. You will find that this path takes us past
the hijack of language by English. More specifically, the information
technology /cognitive science revolution, now under way under the aegis of
English, compels us to revisualize the scene of global competition and the
terms of the liberal commentary accompanying it. Under such a revisualization,
I argue, we will need to reverse this hijack. And the social negotiation for
which linguistics provides space and tools can work out the terms of this
reversal.
1.4 The road to active abdication
What do I mean by
"we will need"? On the way to an answer to that question, let us go
over some basic considerations. We give in to the pressures of a systematizing
apparatus only because we think it will deliver social order, which we think we
need. And we believe in such an order as long as we can see no other alternative
to a chaos that repels us. But we have now been learning that any order that
depends on industriality comes with a price tag attached. The price we pay is a
polluted environment and an underemployed, malaise‑ridden repressive reordering
of society in the name of liberal principles. In other words, such a social
order cannot be sustained. What can?
As we pursue this
question of sustainable alternatives, we find that we have to build a durable
social peace. It is folly to imagine a lasting victory of one side over another
enshrined in some social order. Any victory reflects a sense of war which is
precisely what we will have to overcome. Now you see why we will need to
reverse hijacks of all kinds. And English is as clear a starting point as any
other.
For the English studies
enterprise offers exceptionally favourable circumstances for the struggles
called for. This enterprise can, more easily than other disciplines, mobilize
intellectual energies for a postmodern formulation of the difficulties we face
and of the options we must choose from as we cope with them. And a postmodern
formulation has become necessary.
For all the modern
articulations had postulated a final victory, and it is now clear to us all that
such a victory is not only not in sight, but can no longer be formulated or
understood. Let us consider this problem clearly.
All modern thought has
assumed that some identifiable community that gives priority to rationality
and knowledge, some We, can take up an enlightenment project on a war footing.
Such a community of inquirers, it was thought, could struggle against the
mystification of priestcraft in society. It was believed that this struggle
would build on and employ the results of our grappling with the mysteries of
structures and processes in nature. One hoped that such a confrontation would
place intellectual inquiry in the vanguard and allow technology to apply
inquiry's breakthroughs to what the working population, aware of these rational
breakthroughs, would see as reasonable practical purposes. This sustained
confrontation, it was hoped, would lead to the Enlightenment's ultimate triumph
over all social adversaries opposing the rise of rationality, and a final
victory over all natural adversities afflicting the human species. There was
perhaps an assumption that such a victory would come about through the efforts
of, or could at least be foreseen and understood by, concerned and thinking
individuals in modern societies.
Such a struggle for
independence, in a generalized sense, is no longer seen as a way of organizing
one's energies. Why? The notion of a common war, waged by a unitary global
community of inquirers, no longer makes sense. What we have instead is a deeper
understanding of what is involved in the new struggles that are becoming
necessary. Let us take up some examples of the new or postmodern struggles to
understand how and why this is so.
Women, for instance, have
found it necessary to ask us all, but men in particular, to change our habits
of thought and action in order to increase the rationality in the way we go
about organizing our grasp of thought and feeling in our daily lives, in theory
as well as in practice.
Environmental activists,
to take another example, offer arguments for drastically altering our systems
of industrial production, commercial advertising and distribution, and domestic
consumption. In so doing, they seek to change our equations with the forest
resources, with water, with the air, with paper, with our needs, with our
greeds.
Marginalized
subpopulations such as tribals in India or indigenous peoples elsewhere have
been waging life and death struggles directly connected with the environmental
demands. They too have a vital and direct claim on our attention.
In all these cases, it is
not just a matter of some identifiable public listening to the pleas of some
pressure group and paying attention to that group's position on the issues.
Rather, many of us have to change our habitual assumptions about what attention
itself is supposed to become, about how issues of any kind are formulated and
addressed. Most importantly, those of us who do not feel addressed by what is
said in the relevant movements ‑‑ like smokers left unmoved by the
environmentalist arguments ‑‑ are often those people whose habits of thought
and action most crucially need to change if the core messages of these
movements have any point at all.
This is a new type of
problem. For the postmodern movements to succeed, and we all agree
theoretically that they have to, it has become a necessity for those of us
targeted by these movements ‑‑ men targeted by feminism or smokers targeted by
environmentalism, to take two obvious examples ‑‑ to change ourselves. It has
become a social necessity, not an option whose exercise would make the scene
brighter and us individually more virtuous. And we must change ourselves, for
we will not be compelled by the brute force of some external agent. The
movements targeting us can at most help us to see and face the difficulty of
thinking our way ‑‑ or our various ways ‑‑ out of the not always identical
traps we are caught in. For good or ill, the one‑issue movements for women's
rights, for a clean environment, or for a non‑consumerist culture cannot defeat
us in the sense of classical victory /defeat warfare.
There are two
consequences of this. These consequences make the problem postmodern. One, the
enlightenment's We is now divided, which means the politics of an omnibus coalition
called The Community of Inquirers, a polite name for the community of Intellectuals
Seeing Themselves as General Purpose Teachers, has to give way to a strategy of
plural and purpose‑specific caucuses focused around would‑be learners rather than would‑be teachers. Two, what we
need is active abdication rather than naive dismantlement of systems. The
would‑be learners actively abdicate as they move into the accountable exercise
of power. Their power itself cannot be expected to be eliminated by any lasting
defeat or humiliation. Such expectations would take us back to the military‑outcome
mind‑set of the modern period. It is the impossibility of thinking those
thoughts seriously that places us in the postmodern predicament. And I am
arguing that the appropriate thoughts for today include that of active
abdication.
1.5 From Victimhood to Reciprocity
In this argument, I am
assuming that active abdication is one possible response to the following
predicament.
There has been a power
relation involving some Agent A and some Victim V, perhaps mediated by the fact
that A and V belong to certain categories (white A non‑white V, non‑tribal A
tribal V, male A female V). Agent A has begun to realize that the relation as
it stands is inequitable and A wishes to act on this realization. But A and V
also know that simply dismantling the power relation is not an immediate
possibility. How does Agent A respond to this situation?
Let us quickly rehearse
two acts of the standard modern response, which we cast as a rather
stereotypical drama.
In act one, Agent A does
not respond. Some centralized bureaucracy tells both A and V to stand up, to
have their heads counted, to get their advantage levels measured, and then to
take their rations. The bureaucracy then doles out to A less than A used to
get, doles out to V more than V used to get, and then orders both V and A to go
and be happy.
In act two of this soap
opera, this bureaucracy is dismantled, since all the Agents A feel this is a
raw deal. Bureaucracies give way to a neo‑liberal proposal that the even more
even‑handed new god, the market, be allowed to distribute goodies to A and V on
the basis of the idea that a little bit of inequality peps up the production
system, thus promoting social welfare, and therefore providing real justice.
While we worry over our
private tastes vis‑‑vis these stereotypes,
it may be useful to note that the bureaucracy cartoon and the market cartoon
both exemplify the same modern logic. Some Community of Enlightened Teachers,
who run either a bureaucracy or a market, tells Agent A and Victim V exactly
what they should get, reducing both to the status of victims in the process of
trying impersonally to restore a fairness that A and V cannot restore on their
own.
It is possible that these
methods can maximize equality, under socialism, or productivity and therefore
the generation of social wealth, under the market. My contention is that these
methods uniformly victimize all parties to the earlier conflicts by subjecting
them to the tender mercies of either the bureaucracy or the market, and thus
do not resolve the conflicts themselves. These methods uncomprehendingly
suppress the agency of A and V, which therefore goes underground and becomes
irrational, instead of graduating to the mature stage of facing each other, as
agencies must, and evolving towards insightful reciprocity.
In other words, modern
methods cannot maximize reciprocity. For reciprocity can only come about if
regional subpopulations dealing with each other on the ground realize each
other's difficulties better and if people are willing to act on these realizations.
Reciprocity cannot be brought about by central committees or managerial systems
tinkering with demographic indicators over entire populations.
The predicament that
active abdication or other postmodern methods need to face, then, is not just
that Agent A's subcommunity has been oppressing Victim V's subcommunity and
Agent A now wants to stop this oppression but wants to continue to be useful to
Victim V in some of the old ways, and thus both to preserve and to change the
relation between the subcommunities and the persons involved. The predicament
as we now find it is also one specifically shaped by the interventions of the
modern state, as in the two acts of the soap opera indicated above. Active
abdication is one response to this predicament.
What does it take for
Agent A to count as an active abdicator? I take the following view of the
matter. If Agent A understands where Victim V stands, and if A and V agree
that the crucial perceptions have changed, then the unjust asymmetry that has
marked their dealings can be cancelled by reciprocity of perception ‑‑ provided
that understanding does not stop at tears or words but leads to action.
The active abdication
strategy is thus theoretically superior to the bureaucracy and market methods
of removing injustice. For it ensures that both A and V take active charge of
the process of changing the dynamics between their subcommunities at least in
their personal instances, and for monitoring the durability of this change.
Thus A and V theoretically become partners in the work of leaving behind their
past victimhood, their shared experience of having been trapped in an unhealthy
dynamics which they understand and are consciously cancelling, without
pretending to simply forget it or erase it.
But neither this nor any
other postmodern strategy will break out of the potentiality of theory and work
as a superior method in practice unless the strategy can tap whatever seems to
control the way we actually do or don't direct our energies.
Which brings us to our
next topic.
1.6 English as an Olympian Language
The use of English by
Indians is, among other things, a performance in both the Sports Page sense and
the Entertainment Section sense of the term. Now, one of the major unexamined
features of the modern period that shows no signs of abating has been its
massive investment in national and international sports. Not only have public
and private sectors everywhere invested money. Crowds everywhere have also
cheered them on and invested their emotion. I maintain that examining this side
of modern life will take us to a practical understanding of the language scene
that may suggest a sustainable solution to some of its ills. For the energies
that keep sports going will also make the methods we propose viable ‑‑ if we
are on the right track, notice my choice of metaphor.
Since about 1890, give or
take a decade, most human activities have been measurable. They have been so
completely measurable that the activities of measurement and score‑keeping
became pleasurable. This pleasure did not remain an exclusive preserve of the
business classes. It spilled over into a general public interest in how quickly
or how improbably or how far up or down the heroes of the human race can
perform various feats. The public has found it easiest to express this interest
by cheering for their nation pitted against other nations in contests that are
staged as wars between national teams. This dramatic interest, so managed,
provides the necessary continuing support for the storing of global records
about what are taken to be spectacular achievements. These records provide the
context for Competition as a category.
Much of the public's hero‑worshipping
investment has gone into placing on various pedestals a particular nation's
cricketers, or baseball players, or Olympic runners or swimmers, or Wimbledon
tennis players.
When we consider chess,
there is a cross between physical prowess, the basis of the older kinds of hero
worship, and the new intellectualization of prowess. This intellectualization
of the basis of military conquest requires more than passing mention. It is
one of the factors that made it possible to make the public in the metropolitan
countries accept and endorse the nineteenth century white project of
imperialism. Notice that this project was withdrawn only because it failed to
seem cost‑effective. It did not exactly involve any active abdication on the
part of any substantial number of white role models. For active abdication to
become an option, its theory and practice will have to be invented now, I'm
afraid. So colonization was a matter of earnest chess playing. The chess
players changed the board when they found that the game was not going their
way. That was called decolonization. And the domestic public in the white
countries has been cheering for the overall strategic policies that their governments
pursue vis‑‑vis the southern
countries, during and after the colonial period. They found decolonization a
smart move and cheered when it happened. We need to remember this background as
we try to understand the intellectualization of prowess.
My thesis is that people
cheer for strategic success, not for brute force alone, and that this is where
the sports arena engages the national energies of every modern public. The
public would like to believe that it cheers for the bravest and most
intelligent performers in all spectatorial domains, from sports through
entertainment right upto politics.
This leads to a
particular reading of the undeniable fact that many Indians right now are
cheering for English. I maintain that this cheering responds to the perception
that our champion users of English, especially our international stars who win
fiction prizes or beauty contests (where the contestants are now required also
to out‑talk their rivals), have what it takes to keep us all going, even those
of us who are going to choose to stay where we are and not use very much or
very good English. I would urge you to read this claim in the context of my
more general claim that people are cheering, in all contests, for the
candidates they see as the bravest and the smartest. And please meditate on the
complex word Smartness, with its suggestion that presence of mind can be a
reliable indicator of that quality of understanding which yesterday's
psychology used to call intelligence and define as the ability to learn.
To summarize this
analysis, English is India's Olympian language, its language of performance in
the arena of Smartness. If we make any proposals that ignore this reality, we
are confining ourselves to a preachy and inapplicable exercise.
Now for an expansion of
the analysis so summarized. English is not what you would call neutral. The
business of America is business, and England is a nation of shop‑keepers, to
remind us of stereotypes which inhabit or inhibit the language at least as much
as your Shakespeare or your King James' Bible ever did. The big kick that
contemporaries are getting out of English has to do with a certain celebration
of the rise of the arena of competition as a hegemonic principle.
Why is it that this
spectacularization of all activities can require the critical attention of
thinking people at all? Mainly because the market so conceived, though a poor
paymaster, is at least paying lip service to the general exercise of human
intelligence under conditions of democracy and other prerequisites for
reciprocity. This public return to the principle of intelligence, even if it is
compelled to dress up as Smartness, needs to be construed in the context of a
certain strategic assault on the free exercise of the intellect under
colonialism, fascism, communism, and other militaristic or bureaucratic
regimes. In such a context, I construe it as a Good Thing. Don't you?
To the extent that
English, a carrier of industriality and the open market if it is a carrier of
anything at all, has thus become a sponsor of an exercise of intelligence that
could conceivably result in a maximization of reciprocity, to that extent I
find it possible, in the perspective of my own agenda, to welcome and even to
join the cheering for our country's English performers.
But, if you are at all
smart about it, you will see that this Smartness show is going to fall apart as
soon as the world puts it on the spot, if I too may talk the language of this
business arena for half a second. One smart question to ask is whether to wait
until the whole business crashes and spends a decade or two picking up the
pieces. The smart person's other choice is to take a piece of the action right
now that looks like Your Piece and stash it away where it will still be yours
when everything comes crashing down.
To my way of thinking,
the piece of the action that looks like My Piece is a question of lasting
importance that has come out of the recent experiences of Indian writing in
English: what are we cheering for?
We seem to want brave and
intelligent representatives to give our realities some memorable, durable form
that is continuous with the sharpest edges of contemporary human knowledge,
whence the interface with English. We want this form to reflect some usable
understanding that corresponds to the understanding of the people one is
claiming to speak for. Right now, we seem to find some of the Indian
performances in English endowed with these properties, as far as our criteria will
take us. But we really want to keep making sure that we are getting the best,
most knowledgeable representations possible of a real understanding, both on
the ground and in the aerial views that English seems especially well equipped
to provide thanks to its jet‑setting exponents.
Only as long as we keep
getting the best views are we going to use English as one of our serious
viewing devices.
Those of us who continue
to believe that English is giving us good service now and for ever will, no doubt,
pay attention to some I.T.‑related reasons for wondering if this global competitive
order is a permanent arena for assessing human performances. These reasons
occupy us during the next section of our exercise.
1.7 Cognitive Welfare
Notice that I am not
proposing that we stop assessing anything. I am suggesting that we continue to
assess all the indicators that we view as important. As we continue to think
the way we think, if we only follow all our lines of effort and logic to the
end, then this serious endeavour will in my opinion lead us to modify widely
held perspectives in the direction that I am recommending.
Thus, I do agree with my
principal interlocutors that we should all be trying to maximize welfare, for
all communities and subcommunities. But please notice that the problem of
assessing welfare needs to be freshly visualized in the light of the rapidly
changing scene on cyberspace. Thanks to Information Technology, I.T., we can
no longer compete for quite the same goodies, or in quite the same arenas. Our
division of labour has been changing on many fronts. They often change in
their organizational reality faster than our perceptions can cope with these
changes.
Let us take a look at
certain divisions of labour which are unlikely to survive the I.T.‑related
changes in the global landscape. In independent India, typical of much of the
contemporary planetscape, our society has been running and in fact taking for
granted a linguistic division of cognitive labour. We do most of our literary,
cultural, expressive activities in the Indian languages. And we use the English
of Olympic performance, to encapsulate the argument of the previous section, to
run all the dealings of our nation‑state apparatus with others and with its own
modernity, in business, industry, science, even religion.
The problem is not the
phenomenon which strikes our nativists as a real danger, the phenomenon of
English words being added to the resources of Indian languages or of English
writing finding a niche in our literary system. What does harm the health of
Indian languages is the stultifying ghettoization of Indian languages which
stunts the growth of our mental core as Indian persons, and makes our relaxed
discussions stupid. The way out of this trap is not to move our lives into
English, obviously, but to expand the scope of our own languages as carriers of
the serious knowledge we have acquired. The question is how to do this. And as
we try to get there, we have to find a way around radical proposals to find new
homes in regional language comfort for the entire Indian intelligentsia, higher
education plus scholarly publication apparatus and all. Such relocation
scenarios are non‑starters. Our nation will wish to keep Performing, since the
Olympics in business, science, defence are not exactly optional.
In other words, for the
regional languages to give us the strength we want from them, a way will have
to be found to add them to our strengths, not to subtract for their sake other
strengths we have. Our search for this new way will have to begin by noticing
that the current stultifying ghettoization of our regional language activities
macro‑abridges the knowledge system of our society and micro‑abridges each of
us as a thinking person. We are cut off from our hinterlands. This is a
massive deficit of welfare.
Let me put this welfare
problem in terms that may be widely intelligible. Right now, only the
educational and journalistic dishing‑out to the masses of what privileged
Indians know is conducted in the Indian languages. But we produce and sustain
our knowledge system in English alone. As a result, our discussions in our own
languages are seriously curtailed in scope and depth, making real and even
imaginary participation impossible, and turning the apparently free discussions
upstairs into a mock‑parliamentary shadow‑theatre, given that everybody knows
and understands the consequences of the fact that Downstairs has no access to
this Upstairs except on the dishing‑out terms imposed by Upstairs.
Some of you surely think
that I am making a formal point without teeth and that nobody excluded by such
a system can express dissent of a kind that the system will ever have to take
seriously. In response to that thought, I would like to provide some reasons
for believing that the present superalterns cannot keep the present subalterns
down. For those left out include figures like the noted scholar S.B. who has
published important critical work in Bangla on Bibhutibhushan Bandyopadhyay,
the author of _Pather Paanchaali_. S.B. remarks that her own work or that of
her colleagues like R.S. who have been writing about Bibhutibhushan in Bangla
goes uncited when Anglophone stars like P.C. write about these issues in
English for an all‑India "radical" audience. S.B. argues that
Anglophone stars will have to change their citation practices which currently
frown upon citing work that is not in English. I am using acronyms to mask the
personal identities of those involved as this is not an attempt to be catty, but
evidence that the present order is being challenged by people who cannot be
ignored. Similar figures are easy to find who will make work done in Malayalam,
Marathi, Hindi, or Oriya hard to ignore.
This unstable state of
affairs, then, is going to force us to move towards new goals ‑‑ on the basis
of a new visualization of what counts as the welfare that we work and fight
for. We might set ourselves the personal goal, say, of possessing, even if we
do not consistently use them, comparable capabilities in our own languages and
in English. This goal would make a certain kind of sense in the context of a
new social goal ‑‑ that of redefining appropriate capabilities for these
languages relative to their users now viewed as producers of globally relevant
knowledge, as cooperative colleagues in a seriously global endeavour of
producing and exchanging various types of knowledge. In such a context, one
would view competition only as a means towards the globally acknowledged goal of giving a sharp
edge to this cooperation to keep it serious.
Global acknowledgement of
such goals will have to rest on an associated conception of cognitive welfare
as a basis for cultural health. I will omit a fuller demonstration that such a
conception is not too remote from standard contemporary preoccupations. Such
exercises can be carried out in other contexts. I shall focus only on some of
the essential themes for the moment. The new practical work that is unavoidable
is going to need some theoretical preparation. Hence our theoretical turn.
1.8 Some pieces of the action
We therefore turn now to
some methodological considerations in the evidently crucial task of theory
construction that has to form part of the response to the challenge facing all
rationalities. Our normal routines include some respect for the formal
accountabilities of a mathematics or a logic or a rhetoric. If we need to speak
of a postformal accountability as well, this is because one must face the
increasingly important fact that actions speak louder than the words, the
facts, the figures of a rhetoric, a logic, a mathematics. Our actions have to
become accountable to future actions and action potentials. To clarify this
point, I shall make three more.
Modernity's
Postmodern Punctuation: The formalism of modernity, to continue its formal
custom of accountability past the customer right into the context where the
customer will have to live with the fact that s/he must consume the wares of
modern markets, must watch the oscillation between our two accountings. Watch
the way we punctuate our modern, parsimonious explanation‑maximizing days‑of‑conceptual‑progress
with postmodern, visualization‑adjusting nights‑of‑conceptual‑settlement. It
is during these nights that tents are set up and the silences that must
intervene between discourse and counterdiscourse become real practices.
Knowledge‑Flows
Constitute Locations: Consider the local‑cognitive equation
Action ‑‑> action ‑‑> = Mutual Guesthood
of Teacher and Learner
This cognitive equation, which characterizes
the flows of knowledge that make old and new Locations tick, is already in
practice learning to, and needs to teach itself in theory/formulation how to,
find its way to a healthy dialogue with the centripetal equation due to Foucault:
Action/action = power‑knowledge
It is well‑known that that equation describes
the way that local forces surrender to a centralizing whereby power/knowledge
usurps all the local dignities in the name of sovereignty. I am arguing that
the process of local resistance to this process, both in geographical locations
and in the new regions that drive post‑nationalist social movements like
feminism, calls for a theory of the knowledge‑dignity, typical of locations,
which renders intelligible the basis of the struggle against centralization.
Towards a Round‑the‑Clock
Metacognition:
A theory of knowledge needs to do business not only with familiar moves in day‑time
debating transactions between opponents. Those moves deal with material that in
principle appears clearly and distinctly to both sides, in what one might call
broad daylight. A real metacognitive enterprise must also concern itself with
the shared stage on which such sparring takes place, and the shared screen on
which both sides see the agreed clarities projected. This screen, which comes
into its own only at nightfall, as poetry, is seen during the day only
obscurely, as a background, but it too is seen. And an epistemology must deal
with such seeing as well. This seeing, expressed at what we are calling night
in the poetry that embodies a location or a region, is also material for metacognitive
reworking.
To the extent that we
plan to base an epistemology on the priority of such poetic expression of
background preperception rather than prosaic moves made with foreground
percepts, our philosophy will be accountable to the regional realities as
directly as to the supposedly more precisely accountings we customarily demand.
Such a plan can be a
basis for renegotiating the terms of the game of knowledge. Renegotiating with
whom? With the current owners of that game and its standard arenas.
Negotiations begin when we get our act together and get around to challenging
the industrialized world to prove that what they claim in their intellectual
moments to know can stand up and accept inspection on the terms of a serious
epistemology. I mean this quite literally, in case some of you think this is a
piece of humour or chutzpah. I would like to ask if there is any currently held
theory of language in the ateliers of analytic philosophy, for instance, whose
pursuit of use rather than meaning or whose assumption that only what is not
obvious in the context can be meaningfully said can survive scrutiny on the
basis of, say, the characterization of language use by a Sri Ramakrishna
Paramhansa who notes that prayer, to a deity who by hypothesis already knows
what you are saying, is nevertheless meaningful as deictic reidentification of
the familiar qua familiar? It is the pursuit of questions like these that I have
in mind when I speak of renegotiating the terms of the game of knowledge.
However, direct
confrontations between people unfamiliar with preexisting theories on both
sides serve no purpose. I will therefore in the present context develop tools
for the study of day‑time prosaic knowledge and night‑time poetic knowledge in
the terms of familiar metropolitan concepts used unconventionally to set up a
dialogue with a more round‑the‑clock epistemology of the sort available, say,
in the Indian tradition. Hence the study, in a later section of this argument,
of the relation between the pragmatic and the utopian, which here stand in for
the prosaic and the poetic embodiments of knowledge respectively.
1.9 Three Cheers for a Real Challenge
The considerations we
have gone over take us to the shape of a general challenge. Let us specify it
for particular challengees relative to whom it begins to look real. The
challenge for our literary theory establishment is: Do you have the
intellectual guts to face up to this theoretical articulation and either to
call my bluff if I make no sense or to act on whatever part of this you end up
agreeing with? The challenge for the science establishment is: Will you put
your money where your mouth is? Will you prove that what you advertise as
science ‑‑ as replicable, criticism‑inviting public knowledge ‑‑ is capable of
standing up to real tests, when your hypotheses are restated in the crucibles
of a sufficiently rich spectrum of languages as cognitive systems? If you
refuse to attempt such a proof, will you then publicly admit that your regime
is one of brute force and rests on the commercial viability of the technologies
you spawn and sell? Will you frankly admit that you are a technology service
and stop falsely claiming to be doing "science"?
Such talk is of course
akin to Nehru's old chestnut about hanging the blackmarketeers from the nearest
lamp‑post. Neither the mafiosi of the black money system nor their academic
brethren are going to react to this with their brains; they have enough brawn
to deride, silence and/or ignore this discourse. However, some of their
children occasionally develop strange tastes, even a taste for facing real
challenges. These words are for those children, not for their brazen, corrupt
elders. One is inviting the children of today's English studies and science
establishments, with some bitterness and anger I'm afraid, to face these
challenges if they dare.
Such courage will deserve
a non‑Olympic three cheers.
1.10 Theoretical underpinnings of a practical
agenda
These challenges are only
an 'entertaining' side‑show, to be read ‑‑ with an ironic look at our sense of
spectatorial excitement that makes us look for this kind of spice to make our
challenges sufficiently interesting ‑‑ in the context of the real practical
task that faces our nation at the cross‑roads that we are addressing. The task
is to find an optimal redistribution of the functions of the various knowledge
resources we live by. It is the optimalizing side of this practical task that
makes it relevant to do some theoretical work on our perceptions and what we
can do about them.
In earlier work I have
argued that English manages its presence in India as a naturalist‑classical
language. In the argument I am developing here, I am trying to make this more
precise in terms of the Olympian function of English world‑wide. The Olympian
discourse characteristically plays up the monumentalist imperative. On the one
hand, this logic revives the classical delusions of grandeur of a Roman Empire
or a Sanskrit of purity. On the other hand there is the sense that one is
precisely measuring what human Nature can do. The idea is that this culture of
measurement brings about such a close fit between the classical power‑giving
knowledge and the humans who both possess this knowledge (as its subjects) and
are characterized by it (as its objects) that the Natural and the Cognitive
coincide in this supposedly human, supposedly down to earth and no‑nonsense,
look‑Ma‑no‑assumptions empirical game.
It is this idea of a
close fit that leads the industrial empire of Anglophony, English‑speakingness,
to produce also a quasi‑regional nativism as its Romantic other. This
supposedly localist celebration of particular languages is however a companion
to Anglophony and not a true regionalism in the sense of the argument being
developed here. It is an incipient nationalism of the kind that English knows
how to contain and co‑opt with no effort.
Indeed, industriality has
grown up with, or if you prefer given shape to, these nationalisms, creatures
of war and other forms of mobilization. And recall that the whole point of our
quest is to find a general demobilization, an alternative to the unending cycle
of victories and defeats that pretend to settle all issues by preempting all
future negotiations. Serious regionalism is a matter of facing the realization
that evading the necessary negotiations will never get us anywhere. Nativism
labours under the same general monumentalist illusions as the English umbrella.
The only difference is that it constitutes a defiant little nationalism.
Little, because it accepts defeat beforehand, not being in the same league as
English. Defiant, because it too sets up an ego and has to then defend it by inflating
its territorial claims.
To summarize: we are
dealing, then, with a naturalist classical presence of English in India. This
takes both the sovereign sheltering form of an English running the entire
knowledge system of industriality and the location‑bound sheltered forms of native
languages governing their specific satrapies under orders from that global
mobilization. At both the sovereign and the satrapic levels, the enterprise
combines a classical with a naturalist emphasis. Modern monumentalism offers a
heady mix of a quasi‑Roman classical claim to monumenthood with a naturalist
belief that there is a precise, literal, documentable fit between precisely
this civilization and no other in human nature, no less. To pull ourselves out
of the apparent naturalness of this view, we might usefully compare it with the
belief in eighteenth century France that French was such a rational language
that it directly embodied nothing less than logic itself!
This naturalist string on
this classical bow is in a state of tension that is unlikely to be able to
stand still. To my mind, this tension appears as a question. I ask the question
in the form of wondering what the vectors that constitute the tension are
going to do next. Are they going to go overboard with the naturalist emphasis?
Or with the classicalist one? I set up the present reflections around this
question, so posed.
Both vectors will be
active, of course, on any imaginable scenario. But I wish to argue that there
is an identifiably intelligent and optimal direction in which thinking men and
women can push the logic of this process. This telos is: towards an Esperanto
visualized as a cognitive reclothing of a planet denuded by the predatory
early history of industriality.
The sections that follow
provide material for one possible unpacking of this idea. If some details of my
own unpacking are not made fully explicit, this is mainly a device to help
various readers to redevelop this material in directions compatible with their
own interests and beliefs. With this proviso, here is the way the following
sections of the overall argument are arranged.
The section Against
Denudation offers general epistemological tools. It conceptualizes the current
shift from nations as the dominant umbrella category ‑‑ and the concomitant
imperative of industrializing the nations that places a certain precision‑essentializing
science at the heart of the intellectual enterprise ‑‑ in terms of an anti‑essentialist,
anti‑puristic planet‑reclothing that undoes the old denudations by replacing
global characterizations of explanatory accounts with principled, non‑economistic
and therefore local parsimonies.
The section Against
Essentialism continues this theme by linking the Esperanto praxis ‑‑ as an
embodied Universal Lexical Mediator currency ‑‑ to the ongoing replacement of
all abstract universals with concrete bridging and translating actions. This
section makes specific tools available for studying the link between languages
as the only possible theoretical characterization of meaning and reproducible
truth available after essentialism.
The section Against
Industrality deals with some details of the presence of English in India. It
argues that this presence and by extension the presence of English in many
other societies represents an industrial hijack of the cognitive and that recognizing
this has to be part of any recovery of our cognitive health in and outside
India.
The section Against
Naturalism places our enterprise in the context of a reconceptualization of the
naturalist theory of languages as codes. It provides the metalinguistics that
holds the whole story together.
The final section, on the
Narrative Basis of Cognition, investigates the implications for the humanities
of a cognitive resource oriented approach to knowledge in general and
linguistic knowledge in particular.
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